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Statement of the Case 
(i) 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal taken by the state from a ruling by a District Court, in its 
appellate capacity, reversing a Magistrate's decision denying a Motion to Suppress. 
(ii) 
Course of the Proceedings Below 
The Respondent, Peggy Finnicum, was charged with excessive DUI on 
September 25, 2005. R., p. 5. She entered a Not Guilty plea and filed a Motion to 
Suppress and Amended Motion to Suppress challenging, for purposes of this appeal, 
the constitutionality of the warrantless police entry into her home. R., pp. 17-20. A 
hearing on the Motion was held on December 15, 2005, the Honorable Penny 
Friedlander, Magistrate, presiding. R., pp. 23-26. On February 3, 2006, Judge 
Friedlander denied the Motion, ruling that the police entry was lawful to effectuate 
a Terry style seizure commenced outside the home. R., p. 32. Ms. Finnicum filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration which was heard on July 21, 2006. R., pp. 41-43. Judge 
Friedlander denied the Motion, again ruling that the seizure was valid under Terry 
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and then adding, as a "second basis" for her decision, that there was probable cause 
to arrest. R., pp. 41. 
Ms. Finnicum thereafter entered an approved Conditional Plea to the charge, 
preserving her right to appeal from the denial of her Motion to Suppress. R., pp. 43-
46. After Judgment and Sentence was entered, a Notice of Appeal was timely filed. 
R., pp. 51-52. 
Judge Luster, sitting in his appellate capacity, heard oral argument and 
announced his decision on February 1, 2007. R., 108; Tr., Proceedings. Judge 
Luster reversed the decision denying the Motion to Suppress, ruling that although the 
record supported a finding that there was probable cause to arrest for DUI, the 
Magistrate made no findings, nor was there any factual record to support any 
findings, that exigent circumstances existed that justified the warrantless entry into 
Mr. Finnicum's home. R., p. 108, Tr., Proceedings, pp. 36-38. From this decision, 
the state appeals. R., pp. 121-124. 
(iii) 
Statement of the Facts 
The parties stipulated to the admission of the arresting officer's police report 
as the factual record for the suppression issue, and that has been recited in the state's 
Brief, and need not be repeated again. The Respondent points to certain salient facts 
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set forth in that record which are important to this appeal. The arresting officer 
arrived "on scene" at 1810 (6:10 p.m.) and first had contact with Mr. Finnicum at 
1821 (6:21 p.m.). The alcohol breath test administered to Ms. Finnicum was at 1952 
(7:52 p.m.) after she had been transported to the Kootenai County Jail. Neither 
officer testified to any concerns about the loss of evidence as the reason the entering 
Ms. Finnicum's home. Indeed, the only reason for entry came from the second 
officer, a concern about "officer safety" because the initial dispatch concerned a 
domestic dispute. He admitted he saw no evidence after arriving on the scene that 
any weapons were involved or available, and this justification for the uninvited and 
warrantless entry into the home has not been seriously advanced by the state at any 
level of this litigation. In addition, there was no evidence offered by the state about 
an attempt to obtain, or the inconvenience or delay in attempting to obtain a warrant 
prior to entry. 
The Court should also note that after she was escorted out of her home, Ms. 
Finnicum was questioned about her activities that day, how much and what she had 
to drink, when her last drink was, etc., pursuant to a DUI investigation, and then 
required to submit to field sobriety tests. After the breath test, when she was told for 
the first time she had a right to an attorney and a right to remain silent, she 
immediately invoked her constitutional rights. 
-Page 3-
Issues Presented on Appeal 
1. May the police make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a residence in 
order to effectuate a Terry stop? 
2. Did the District Court properly rule that the Magistrate's decision was not 
supported by either a factual record or a finding by the Magistrate that the warrantless 
entry into the Respondent's home was justified by exigent circumstances? 
Standard of Review 
Respondent agrees with the Standard of Review set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
Argument 
I. State v. Maland does not authorize police entry into a home to complete 
a Terry style seizure commenced outside the home 
In State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 818 (2004), the Court held "that police 
may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a residence in order to 
effectuate a Terry stop .... " 
"The State argues that the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment do 
not prevent an officer from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a 
suspect's home to effectuate a Terry stop, which began at the threshold of the 
suspect's home. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Santana, this Court in 
State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237 (1997), held that an officer's warrantless entry into 
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a defendant's residence in order to complete the Terry stop did not violate the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the Court in Manthei, there was 
"no reason to distinguish between entry into a residence to complete a Terry stop and 
entry to complete a probable cause-based arrest." Id. At 240. Manthei was wrongly 
decided and must be overruled. Manthei has led to the erroneous argument that law 
enforcement officers may enter a home to effectuate a Terry stop when there is no 
probable cause for an arrest, nor exigent circumstances including, but not limited to, 
officer or other's safety. [Citations omitted]. For the same reasons, State v. Hinson, 
132 Idaho 110 (1998) was also wrongly decided and must be overruled." State v. 
Maland, 140 Idaho at 823. 
The state again argues, as it did in Manthei, that there is no "reason to 
distinguish" entry in to a residence when the police have reasonable grounds to 
suspect criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), as 
opposed to probable cause to arrest. This arguments ignores the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), as well as 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In the former, the Court drew a clear 
line protecting the sanctity of a home that may not be crossed absent probable cause 
to arrest and exigent circumstances, and in the latter the Court held that no "seizure" 
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occurs until there is a literal seizure of the person by the police. The argument that 
the police seizure in this case occurred outside the home ignores California v. 
Hodari D., and in any event is a distinction without a difference. The Court in 
Maland was quite clear that no warrantless police entry is justified to "effectuate" a 
Terry stop, and accordingly the District Court did not err in overruling the 
Magistrate's decision. 
II. Exigent circumstances were not present and did not authorize the 
warrantless entry into the Respondent's home 
As previously noted, there was no testimony or evidence at the suppression 
hearing that an emergency existed and no time to obtain a warrant prior to the entry 
into the Respondent's home. Neither officer expressed the concern for a loss of 
evidence now advocated by the state, nor provided any testimony as to the time it 
would take to obtain a warrant. More importantly, and contrary to the state's 
inaccurate characterization of the trial Court's findings (See, Brief of Appellant, pp. 
11- I 2), Judge Friedlander did not find that the entry was justified by exigent 
circumstances. She simply found, as a "second basis", there was probable cause to 
arrest. R., p. 41. 
The state argues this is inconsequential, as the fact that probable cause existed 
to arrest for a DUI ipso facto establishes exigent circumstances under Idaho law. 
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Respondent disagrees with this analysis. 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the "seminal case" relied 
upon by the state, a factual record supported the finding of an emergency that excused 
the preference for a warrant. "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood 
¢{} 
begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the system." Brief of Appellant, p. 13, quoting Schmerber v. California. No 
such evidence was provided to the trial Court in this case. 
Furthermore, the "exigent circumstances exception does not apply where there 
is time to secure a warrant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,501 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In Robinson, the "officers further testified regarding the impracticability of obtaining 
a warrant at such a late night hour, saying it ordinarily took several hours." State v. 
Robinson, supra at 501. No such evidence was offered to justify the warrantless 
entry committed in this case. The District Court correctly declined to find such an 
impediment exists, given telephonic warrants and the ease one may be obtained under 
Idaho law. See, State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81 (2004). Accordingly, in the authorities 
cited by the state, evidence was presented to the trial court from which a finding of 
an emergency would support a warrantless entry into a home. No such evidence was 
presented in this case. 
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The officers' actions after entering and removing the Respondent from her 
home belie any concern on their part about the loss of evidence. They interrogated 
her, with first advising her of her constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), conducted their standardized field sobriety evaluations, and 
waited until arriving at the Kootenai County Jail, over an hour after entry into her 
home, before administering the alcohol analysis/breath test. No call was made for 
a portable breath testing device, nor reason offered for this delay. These facts do not 
lead to a finding by implication that a exigency existed, even though it may have been 
"unarticulated" by the officers. 
" ... at the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from umeasonable intrusion. In terms that apply 
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has 
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that 
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980). 
The warrantless, nonconsensual entry into the home committed in this case was 
unconstitutional and not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement, and 
the Motion to Suppress should have been granted, as the District Court properly 
found and ruled. 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the decision of the 
District Court be affirmed. 
Dated t?-is fl day of October, 2008. 
~~- k17 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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